I'm currently reading a book called Stumbling on Happiness, written by a Harvard psychology professor. It's a fascinating book that is part psychology, part philosophy, part cognitive neuroscience, part behavioural economics and all highly recommended. It aims to systematically and irrefutably answer the question, "Why do people so poorly imagine their ideal futures that they are rarely happy when they achieve them?"
To illustrate a piece of the puzzle, Gilbert relates an anecdote of a pygmy named Kenge who is led out of the dense, tropical forests of Africa by an anthropologist for the first time1. While out in the open plains, Kenge sees buffalo in the far distance as small, black specks and asks what they are. When told what they are he roars out in laughter telling the anthropologist not to tell him lies!
Having lived his entire life in a dense forest, Kenge had never learned that objects in the distance appear smaller and blurrier than objects that are close to us, something that we all take for granted.
The key leap that Gilbert then makes is that seeing in time is like seeing in space. When young couples are asked to describe getting married, those with a date in a few months use abstract, blurry phrases like "making a serious commitment" while those getting married the next day offer concrete details like "having pictures made" or "wearing a special outfit"2.
The key difference between spacial and temporal blurriness however, is that our minds are aware of the fact that the buffalo are blurry and ambiguous because they are far away, but they tend to believe that future events appear to be blurry and ambiguous because they are blurry and ambiguous. It explains why we frequently make future commitments that we dread fulfilling when the time comes.
Throughout the last few decades, the automakers have had to regularly meet with the unions to negotiate their collective bargaining agreement. And they have exhibited remarkably consistent behaviour in their bargaining, favouring larger, longer-term concessions versus smaller, short-term ones. For example when faced with a 3% wage raise and 50% salary pension pay-out, the automakers would instead counter with a 2.5% wage raise and a 75% salary pension pay-out.
The automakers were essentially acting as if future payment did not exist at all! They were almost literally trading a dollar today for a hundred dollars twenty years from now. And now, in this economic climate, the time has come for the automakers to fulfill their commitments - and they are dreading it...
1. C. Turnbull, The Forest People (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961), 222.
2. N. LIberman and Y. Trope, "The Role of Feasibility and Desirability Considerations in Near and Distant Future Decisions: A Test of Temporal Construal Theory," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 5-18 (1998)
Stumbling on Happiness (along with The Paradox of Choice) have been sitting on my bookshelf for a long time now, in the queue. One of these days I'll get around to them... But in the meantime, here are some (slightly fuzzy) thoughts on your post:
ReplyDelete"future events appear to be blurry and ambiguous because they are blurry and ambiguous"
This seems to be a result of a folk metaphysics of time--namely that the future is, in some sense, 'open' or indeterminate. I wonder if this picture about the metaphysics of time interacts with our belief system in terms of preventing 'closure'.
Cognitive closure on a topic is something like 'settling on a belief' on that topic, which allows to make decisions on actions more easily. So maybe the folk metaphysics of time prevents cognitive closure regarding future events, and this inhibits our ability to make decisions about future events/makes it harder to 'feel' the effects of the implications of future events.
I'm thinking of a "2 system" picture to our cognitive architecture such that our default is this on/off notion of belief where we have automatic mechanisms that lead to closure to allow us reason in the face of uncertainty more easily. The other system is something like our explicit use of probability thoery with a more graded notion of belief (certainly not digitized to believing vs not believing). We`re naturally not very good at this and it takes more work, so we only bust it out in higher stakes situation and only if we have the right training.
So I`m thinking the first on/off belief system is hooked up to our affective system much more strongly, and so we 'feel' the short term gains (which we can get cognitive closure for) but not the long term ones (for which our conception of time prevents closure for). The same way paying with a credit card doesn't trigger the same neural response as physically forking over cash, perhaps future gains don't trigger the same reward system as more concretely imaginable immediate gains.